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Abstract
This paper contributes to the emprical debate on rm heterogeneity in
international trade dealing with the direction of causality from which the
performance premium across destination markets originates. For this pur-
pose, we 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rms into markets with asymmetric
income levels exploring which 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year to year basis we investigate the factors that drive these movements. We
search for the heterogeneity in post-entry e¤ects of trading with di¤erent
type of markets by establishing treatment models in line with the learning
by exporting hypothesis. Our results indicate self-selection mechanisms and
post-entry e¤ects di¤er from market to market for Turkish manufacturing
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1 Introduction
The characteristics of the markets that rms trade with has gained special im-
portance in rm heterogeneity and trade literature. Researchers have developed
models on exports with asymmetric countries and asymmetric sunk costs of entry
(Helpman et al., 2007; Chaney, 2008). According to these models, self-selection
process operates market by market as rms face di¤erent obstacles to enter dif-
ferent markets. That is rms with lower productivity levels serve markets with
low productivity thresholds (less developed markets) whereas higher productivity
rms can export to markets with high productivity thresholds (more developed
markets). Alongside with these theoretical models, empirical evidence supports
that exporters to more developed economies show ex-ante superior performance
compared to less developed country exporters (Pisu, 2008; Serti and Tomasi, 2009;
Conti et al., 2010; Silva et al., 2012).
In addition to the pre-entry performance premia across di¤erent destinations
with di¤erent income levels, the post-entry e¤ects of exporting on rm perfor-
mance by destination has received particular attention in the related literature
(De Loecker, 2007; Damijan et al., 2004). Post-entry di¤erentials of exporting by
destination markets may emerge since (i) developed countries are endowed with
more advanced technology and knowledge accumulation serving such economies is
expected to generate more learning e¤ects compared to exporting to less advanced
economies (ii) rms face higher competition in more advanced markets forcing
them to improve their e¢ ciency. However, evidence on the fact that the e¤ect
post-entry mechanisms di¤er across markets is rare and less conclusive compared
to self selection mechanisms into the export markets.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to this strand of literature by not only
investigating the rmsself selection into asymmetric markets but also focusing on
the post entry e¤ects of rms engagement in those markets with di¤erent devel-
opment levels for Turkey. Particularly, we attest that whether Turkish exporters
to more developed countries show ex-ante superior performance compared to less
developed economies. Further, we investigate whether there exists heterogeneity
in post-entry e¤ects associated with Turkish rmsinvolvement in di¤erent type
of export markets. Specically, we identify the di¤erentials in immediate and fu-
ture productivity gains upon export entry of rms into asymmetric markets with
di¤erent income levels.
This paper provides evidence for self selection into asymmetric markets and
di¤erentials in post-entry e¤ects arose by involvement in these asymmetric markets
exploiting a comprehensive dataset of Turkish manufacturing rms over the period
2003-2011. Turkey is a particularly interesting developing economy to study as
during the period in question it has experienced a dramatic export boom as well
as undergoing a structural transformation process in terms of its production and
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trade patterns along with sectoral and geographical diversication.
In order to carry out our analyses, we rst group countries using World Banks
classication according to their gross national income per capita and, distinguish
between two mutually exclusive groups of markets: High-income (HI) countries
and Medium-Low-income (MLI) countries. We present descriptive evidence on
the fact that exporting to HI countries is associated with better performance with
respect to that of exporting to MLI countries in Turkish manufacturing industry.
Next, we address whether being an HI exporter is correlated with rms ex-ante
superior performance with respect to MLI exporter by comparing the characteris-
tics of rms that start exporting to HI markets with those of always MLI exporters
some years before entry. Then, we proceed by estimating dynamic probit models
emphasizing the role of sunk costs in selection into di¤erent types of destination
markets. We also investigate whether rms which increase their share of exports
towards HI countries show ex-ante superior performance with respect to those de-
creasing the regarding share. Finally, we search for the heterogeneity in post-entry
e¤ects of trading with di¤erent type of markets by establishing treatment models.
We combine Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology with Di¤erence in
Di¤erence (DID) estimators to test whether there are higher productivity gains
for rms exporting their products to relatively more advanced economies.
Our contribution to the regarding literature is twofold. First of all, we provide
a detailed investigation of heterogeneity in self-selection mechanism as well as post-
entry e¤ects associated with rmsinvolvement in di¤erent types of export markets
with di¤erent income levels. Second, to the best of our knowledge this study is the
rst attempt to investigate this topic for Turkey. Although positive productivity
gains upon export entry is documented for Turkey (Yasar and Rejesus, 2005; Aldan
and Gunay, 2008; Maggioni, 2012; Dalg¬ç et al., 2014), the potential channels
through which performance di¤erentials may arise has not been yet established.
We fulll this gap by introducing the information on rm level destination of
exports.
The results of the study provide evidence that development stage of destination
markets matter in explaining the observed di¤erentials in exportersperformances.
Our results indicate self-selection mechanisms and post-entry e¤ects di¤er from
market to market for Turkish manufacturing rms. Specically, we conrm that
rms that are more productive, larger, more capital intensive and paying higher
wages self select into more advanced export markets. Even if HI exporters already
show ex-ante superior performance with respect to the MLI exporters, they could
improve their performance di¤erential after the export entry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
overview of the literature. Section 3 discusses data and preliminary descriptive
evidence. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical investigation. Section 5
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concludes.
2 The Literature
General equilibrium models of international trade Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al.
(2003) have built the formal theoretical framework of international trade models
with heterogeneous rms. These studies demonstrate how the most productive
rms self select into export markets. Due to the existence of sunk costs and
di¤erent productivity levels within the same industry, only the most productive
rms could a¤ord to pay the sunk costs and nd it protable to sell in foreign
markets. An alternative but not mutually exclusive explanation that points to the
superior performance of exporters is that rms can become more e¢ cient after
they begin exporting through learning or economies of scale e¤ects (Clerides et
al., 1998). Wagner (2007), and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) surveys the ongoing
rms heterogeneity literature on exports.
The empirical literature on rm heterogeneity in international trade has
recently evolved through further exploring the diversication of rmsactivities,
both with respect to their geographical and product diversication i.e. country
and product extensive margins (see Mayer and Ottoviano, 2007). Accordingly,
trade is found to be concentrated in a few rms within an industry which are
characterized by a high degree of both product and geographical diversication.
The reason behind the fact that a small number of rms are diversied among
geographical distances and products, can be attributed to the theoretical view
that exporters incur additional costs. Studies of Bernard et al. (2007) for US,
Muuls and Pisu (2007) for Belgium, Eaton et al. (2004) for France and Castellani
et al. (2010) for Italy support this theoretical view. Furthermore, a diversication
premia is found by Andersson et al. (2008) and Castellani et al. (2010) claiming
a positive relationship between rm performance and geographical and product
diversication.
Along with the number of foreign markets that rms serve the character-
istics of these markets gain importance in rm heterogeneity and trade literature.
Recently, researchers have attempted to develop models on exports with asym-
metric countries and asymmetric sunk costs of entry. Helpman et al. (2007) and
Chaney (2008) presents a theoretical model that builds on Melitzs (2003) model
and nd out that self-selection depends on the market that the rm operates in a
gravity sense assuming that market entry costs di¤er across markets. According to
these models, rms with lower productivity levels serve markets with low produc-
tivity thresholds (less developed markets) whereas higher productivity rms can
export to markets with high productivity thresholds (more developed markets).
Empirical evidence supports that exporters to more developed economies
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show ex-ante superior performance compared to less developed country exporters.
For instance, investigating Belgian rms Pisu (2008) show that before entering
export markets exporters has higher productivity levels than rms exporting to
less developed countries. Serti and Tomasi (2009) nd empirical evidence for
Italian rmshigher productivity levels for high-medium income country exporters
compared to European and low -income countries. For Italy, Conti et al. (2010)
nds that rms with higher productivity levels and higher skilled labor shares have
a higher probability to export to industrial markets outside Europe. Silva et al.
(2012) nd empirical evidence for Portuguese rms that rms that start serving
to developed markets are ex-ante the most productive.
In addition to the pre-entry performance premia across di¤erent desti-
nations with di¤erent characteristics, the post-entry e¤ects of exporting on rm
performance by destination of exports receives particular attention in the related
literature. For instance, since developed countries are endowed with more ad-
vanced technologies serving such economies is expected to generate more learning
e¤ects compared to exporting to less advanced economies. Evidence on the fact
that the e¤ect post-entry mechanisms di¤er across markets is rare and less conclu-
sive compared to self selection mechanisms (Wagner, 2007). Analyzing Slovenian
rms, De Loecker (2007) reports higher productivity gains for rms exporting
to higher income regions. Similarly, Damijan et al. (2004) report evidence on
Slovenian exporters that learning e¤ects can arise only for the rms exporting to
more advanced markets.
3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
3.1 Data Description
In this paper, we utilize a recent rm level panel merging two di¤erent datasets
collected by Turkish State Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT) and described as
follows:
The Annual Industry and Service Statistics is a census of rms with more
than 19 employees while it is a representative survey for rms with less than 20
employees. For this study, we select the whole population of private Turkish man-
ufacturing rms with 20 employees or more1. In the dataset, rms are classied
1Firms with 20 and more than 20 employees account for a large share of Turkish manufacturing
industry. For example, they constitute 87% of production in value and 75% of employment in
2009. It shows a similar pattern in the previous and following years. Moreover in the presence of
sunk costs since trade activity is mostly performed by large rms our selection does not create
biased results.
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according to their main activity, as identied by Eurostats NACE Rev.1.1 stan-
dard codes for sectoral classication2. The database provides detailed information
on a number of structural variables which are mainly seen on a rms balance
sheet such as revenues, value added, labour cost, intermediate inputs cost, tan-
gible and intangible investment costs3 together with information on industry and
geographical location, foreign ownership and the number of employees. We calcu-
late capital stock series of rms applying the perpetual inventory methodology and
using the data on investment cost series for machinery and equipment, building
and structure, transportation equipment and computer and programming.
The Foreign Trade Statistics consists of the imports and exports at 12-digit
GTIP classication the rst 8 digits of whom correspond to CN classication
whereas the last 4 digits are national. The information on the origin/destination
countries of trade ows is also available in the dataset.
Our unbalanced panel covers longitudinal data of XX di¤erent rms over the
period 2003-2011. The original sample size in the merged dataset was slightly
larger but we applied a cleaning procedure which is largely inspired by Hall and
Mairesse (1995). We threw out the abnormal observations (zero / negative) for
the main variables such as output, intermediate inputs, labor cost etc. Then, we
excluded observations where main variables and ratios (e.g. employee, value added
per employee, capital per employee) display extraordinary jumps and drops over
one year. Finally, we excluded rms in NACE sectors 16 (Manufacture of tobacco
products), 23 ( Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel),
30 (Manufacture of o¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery), 37 (Recycling)
since they include small number of rms. We end up with a sample of 18,286 rms
on average on a yearly basis or 164,580 observations in total.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis
Before proceeding in the evaluation of the rm heterogeneity with respect to the
trading partners, we rst group traders according to the type of market they trade
with. We use World Banks classication of countries according to their income
levels (gross national income per capita), and distinguish between two mutually
exclusive groups of countries High-income countries (HI) and Medium-Low-income
countries (MLI)4. Figure 1 presents the evolution of Turkish private manufacturing
2The economic activities that are included in the survey are the ones in the NACE sections
from C to K, and from M to O.
3All nominal values are deated using 4-digit NACE price indices with the base year 2003. For
capital goods we use an aggregate investment deator provided by the Ministry of Development.
Wages are deated by consumer price index.
4Medium-Low-income countries correspond to non high-income countries, dened by the
World Bank as countries with 2007 per-capita gross national incomes lower than $11,456 com-
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rmsexport orientation towards high and medium-low income destination markets
over 2003-2011. One can observe that the share of exports to HI countries in total
manufacturing export value declines while the share of exports to MLI increases
accordingly. This evidence is in line with the fact that Turkey has witnessed a
transition across its destination markets where the EU and EFTA regions lose
grounds towards new markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as
well as in Europe and Central Asia.
Insert F igure 1 here
We move forward by creating several rm level dummies for identifying the
rmsexport market orientation as shown in Table 1. First, we make a relatively
more conservative classication and dene a set of export dummies decomposing
the exporting status of rms into exports to only HI countries, only MLI countries,
and both type of countries. That is we categorize rms exporting only to the HI
regions as only high income exporters; rms exporting only to the MLI regions as
only medium-low income exporters and, rms exporting both to the HI and MLI
regions as both high and medium-low income exporters. In this way, we are able to
identify three mutually exclusive dummies (ExporterOnly HI ; ExporterOnly MLI ,
ExporterBoth) one for each kind of exporter.
Next we make use of export shares to further explore how much of its total
export volume is concentrated towards each region. In particular, we dene rms
selling more than 50% of their total exports to HI regions as HI exporters and
similarly rms directing more than 50% of their total export volume to MLI re-
gions as MLI exporters. Accordingly, we identify two mutually exclusive dummies
(ExporterHI 50; ExporterMLI 50) one for each region. indicating the export sta-
tus of the rms. For example ExporterHI 50 takes value 1 if the rm is a HI
exporter and 0 otherwise.
Alternatively, taking the advantage of our trade data which also includes prod-
uct level information, we dene another set of dummies as follows. We count
the export lines (i.e. product-country pairs) within each rm. Accordingly, if
the number of export lines towards HI regions is higher than the number of
export lines to MLI regions within a rm, then it is identied to be a HI ex-
porter in terms of its export lines. We dene two mutually exclusive dummies
(ExporterHI line; ExporterMLI line) one for each region.
Insert Table 1 here
In Table 2, we present the number of exporters in each group as well as total
number of exporters in each year. According to rst three columns, while the
puted in U.S. dollars using the Atlas conversion factor.
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majority of rms trade with more than one group, there are a small number of
rms exporting to just one group of countries (see Table 2). Distribution of number
of rms in every year according to above mentioned categories is presented in
Table 3. While in absolute terms the numbers of HI exporters seem to be stable,
the share of HI exporters in total number of exporters decreases throughout the
analysis period. For instance, in terms of the category with respect to number of
export lines the share of high income exporters declined from 59 percent in 2003
to 38 percent in 2011.
Insert Table 2 here
Insert Table 3 here:
4 Empirical Analyses
4.1 Exporterspremia across destination markets
Previous theoretical analyses based on the gravity model provides a stylized fact
showing trade is increasing in GDP of partner countries (XX). Given this the-
oretical framework empirical research supports the view that exporters to more
developed economies show ex-ante superior performance compared to less devel-
oped countries (Pisu, 2008; Serti and Tomasi, 2009). Motivated by this stylized
fact, in this section, we present descriptive statistics and premia regressions in or-
der to get some insight on the relationship between observed initial heterogeneity
of rms and export market orientation.
First, using a number of performance criteria of rms we try to assess whether
rm performance di¤erentiates conditional upon the development stage of destina-
tion markets. Particularly, we consider total factor productivity (TFP) which we
calculate using the Levinsohn and Petrins (2003) methodology5, standard labour
productivity (LP) dened as value added (gross output net of intermediate in-
puts) per employee, capital intensity (ratio of the capital stock to the number of
employees), wage per employee (WAGE_L), total manufacturing sales (SALES)
and number of employees (EMP). Table 4, shows the means of the various per-
formance criteria for rms exporting to destination markets with di¤erent income
levels. Our ndings suggest that rms exporting to both kind of regions outper-
form others (Table 4). That is both HI and MLI exporters are the most productive,
most capital intensive and largest in terms of number of employees and sales, pay
5Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) provides a semi- parametric approach for TFP estimation.
In this approach, TFP is measured as the residual of labour and capital under Cobb-Douglas
technology, employing the rmsusage of intermediate inputs as a proxy variable for unobserved
productivity shocks.
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the highest wages. This nding is in line with the branch of literature suggesting
that rms which are more diversied in terms of country and product margins per-
form better with respect to the less diversied rms (Chaney, 2007; Helpman et.
al, 2007; Wagner, 2007). This might also depend on the di¤erential between the
magnitudes of scale of operation for both HI and MLI exporters and the remaining
groups. Only MLI exporters are always the worst performers in all criteria. As
can be seen in Table 4, HI exporters show superior performance with respect to
MLI exporters.
Insert Table 4 here:
Next, we continue assessing exporterspremia with respect to the development
stage of destination markets . We estimate the following relationship between
the selected rm level performance indicators and our dummies for export market
orientation:
yit = 0+i+1Exporter
Only HI
it +2Exporter
Only MLI
it +3Exporter
Both
it +Controls+"it
The dependent variable yit measures the logarithm of either rmstotal fac-
tor productivity (TFP), labour productivity (LP), capital intensity, wage per em-
ployee, sales or number of employees where the subscript i denotes individual rms
and t indexes year. Dummies for the export market orientation are denoted by
ExporterOnly HI ; ExporterOnly MLI and ExporterBoth, respectively, dummy vari-
ables for a only HI exporters, only MLI exporters and both HI and MLI exporters.
The coe¢ cients 1; 2 and 3in front of the export orientation dummies represents
the average trading premia for rms exporting to various regions, with respect to
the baseline category of non-exporters. We utilize a series of control variables
denoted by the vector of Controls including the logarithm of rms number of
employees6, foreign ownership dummy, import status dummy indicating whether
a rm is an importer or not, two-digit sector dummies, region7 and year dummies.
We also incorporate rm specic time invariant xed e¤ects as trading status of
rm is expected to be highly correlated these e¤ects within the context of rm
heterogeneity8.
6We do not control for size in the sales and employment regressions. Moreover, the regresions
are robust to the usage of alternative size dummies instead of number of employees.
7The region dummies identify the 12 Turkish regions distrubuted according to the NUTS 2
classication.
8We also estimate regarding eqution by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology. Indeed,
in terms of our selected performance criteria the coe¢ cients representing the exporterspremia
declines signicantly in the xed e¤ects specications. For the sake of bravity we do not report
OLS results, they are available upon request.
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The results obtained from xed e¤ects regressions are presented in Table 5.
They conrm previously observed ndings from mean values of various perfor-
mance criteria. We nd that rms exporting to both HI and MLI countries have
the highest premia. As discussed above, the nding that rmsexporting to both
group of countries showing the highest premia may reect the fact that rm per-
formance is increasing with rms geographical scope. In addition, rms exporting
only to HI countries perform better than rms exporting only to MLI countries.
To present a more consistent picture of exporterspremia across destination mar-
kets we turn to our other denitions of dummies for export market orientation
(ExporterHI 50; ExporterMLI 50; ExporterHI line; ExporterMLI line). Hence, us-
ing these dummies we estimate two more xed e¤ects regressions with the same
controls as above for each performance indicator (Table 5). Results from these
regressions conrm that HI exporterspremia are always higher than rms selling
to MLI countries. This is an expected result as exporting to more advanced coun-
tries which brings about stronger product di¤erentiation and market competition
is accompanied by better rm performance.
Insert Table 5 here:
4.2 Evidence on Self-Selection Process
So far, we present descriptive evidence on the fact that exporting to HI countries
is associated with better performance with respect to that of exporting to MLI
countries in Turkish manufacturing industry. This nding could be attributed
to either HI country exportersshowing ex-ante superior performance compared
to MLI exporters or post-entry performance di¤erentials among rms exporting
towards di¤erent types of regions.
We start with addressing the question whether being an HI exporter is cor-
related with rms ex-ante superior performance with respect to MLI exporter.
Advocates of the self selection hypothesis stress the size of sunk costs in the deci-
sion to enter foreign markets through exports. Models on exports with asymmetric
countries and asymmetric sunk costs of entry argues that self-selection into dif-
ferent markets arises due to the di¤erent sunk costs across di¤erent destinations
(Helpman et al., 2007; Chaney, 2008). Since markets di¤er in terms of distance,
income, familiarity, legal or institutional structures, exporters come up with dif-
ferent sunk costs across markets. Besides, from a similar point of view of Bernard
et al. (2003) suggest that due to the higher competition rms face in developed
markets, a stronger rm performance is required for entering these markets. Thus,
in the subsequent analyses we allow for di¤erences in sunk costs between di¤erent
types of export markets.
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We rst compare the characteristics of rms that start exporting to HI markets
with those of always MLI exporters some years before entry. In order to do so we
dene a HI export starter as a rm which had never exported to a high income
country in the previous year (t-1) and start to exporting to HI countries in period
t. We have eight cohorts each correspond to a year between 2004 and 2011. We
regress rmscharacteristics at time t  on a dummy variable indicating if a rm
is a HI starter at time t and on a set of controls:
yit  = 0 + i + 1Starter
only_HI
it + 2Starter
only_MLI
it + 3Starter
Both
it
+ Controlst  + "it; with 1    3:
where StarterHI is a dummy variable taking value one if the rm is a HI starter
and zero if the rm is always an MLI exporter (Table 6). Controls variables include
the logarithm of rms number of employees, foreign ownership dummy, import
status dummy indicating whether a rm is an importer or not, two-digit sector
dummies, region and year dummies. Alternatively, for robustness we dene HI
sustainers category as rms which had never exported to a high income country
in the previous year (t-1) and start to exporting to HI countries in period t and
continue to export to HI markets one period further (t+1) (Table 6). Similar to
HI starters we regress rmscharacteristics at time t   on HI sustainers at time
t and on a set of controls.
As Tables 6A and 6B show rms that start exporting to HI countries are
ex ante larger, more productive, more capital intensive and pay higher wages
than non-exporters. Due to the self-selection mechanism at work rms that start
exporting to MLI countries also show superior performance with respect to never
exporters. However, this performance premia for HI starters (sustainers) is larger
compared to that of MLI starters in terms of all criteria. For instance, two years
before entering the HI export market, HI starters are already approximately 12
percent more productive (in terms of TFP) than always non-exporters while MLI
starters are only 7 percent more productive than always non-exporters (Table
6A). The evidence presenting that rms exporting to HI countries exhibit ex-ante
performance advantages with respect to those that do not export to high income
countries suggest that rms bear higher sunk costs in more developed regions of
the world.
Insert Table 6A here:
Insert Table 6B here:
To provide a more clear view of selection processes based on sunk costs we
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move on to a dynamic framework and estimate a dynamic panel probit model9.
Past trade experience of rms is one of the most important determinant of rms
current trade status (Roberts and Tybout 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). To
account for sunk costs we include lagged dependent variable i.e. lagged export
status of rms and estimate the following random e¤ects panel probit equation:
P (yit = 1; xit; yit 1; ui) = f(+ yit 1 + 
0xit + ui) (1)
In the above dynamic estimation model subscript i and index t denotes the
individual rms and years, respectively. The binary variable yit indicates whether
the rm is a HI exporter (MLI exporter) or not in one of three subsequent forms
i.e. ExporterHI 50 (ExporterMLI 50) or ExporterHI line (ExporterMLI line) re-
spectively. x consists of our lagged rm level performance indicators (TFP, wage
per employee, capital intensity and number of employees) including the mean of
these variables as well as region, sector and year dummies as controls. ui captures
the rm level unobservables where f denotes the cumulative normal distribution
and where ui can be expressed as 10:
ui = o + 1yi0 + 2xi + i (2)
The results of the random e¤ects dynamic probit model for HI exporters and
MLI exporters are presented in Table 7. The coe¢ cients of the lagged depen-
dent variables indicate that rms face sunk costs of engaging into export markets.
Comparing the coe¢ cients of these variables for HI exporters and MLI exporters
we show that HI exporters face higher sunk costs than MLI counterparts. To il-
lustrate consistent with our previous ndings, estimated coe¢ cient of the lagged
dependent variable in the HI exporter equations is larger than that in the MLI
exporter equations. Moreover, the initial exporting status coe¢ cients are high in
magnitude and statistically signicant correcting for the bias introduced by the
initial conditionproblem. We conrm that the more productive, the larger the
rms are, the more capital intensive XX more likely they self select into export
markets.
Insert Table 7 here:
9The dynamic specication also allows us to to consider the potential endogeneity between
rmsinvolvement in export markets and rm performance.
10In order to deal with the initial condition bias existing in dynamic limited dependent variable
models and the possible correlation between the controls and unobserved heterogeneity we utilize
Wooldridges (2005) methodology which models rm specic e¤ects ui as a function of the initial
condition and other explanatories. Accordingly, the model becomes a random e¤ects probit
model.
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We further explore whether rmsthat increase their share of exports towards
HI countries show ex-ante superior performance with respect to the rms that
decrease the regarding share. Particularly, we dene rms increasing share of
exports towards HI regions as upgrading their status and decreasing this share as
worsening. By this way, we end up with eight cohorts of transition from one year
to another corresponding to 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-
2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. We estimate a probit model over
the pooled sample of these cohorts where the categorical dependent variable is a
bivariate dummy taking value one if the rm upgrades its status and zero otherwise.
The explanatory variables in the probit specication consists of the selected rm
characteristics prior to the transition (in t-1 or in t-2) and region, sector and year
dummies as controls. Findings from the regarding probit estimations show that
the probability of upgrading is positively associated with productivity, size and
capital intensity (see Table 8).
Insert Table 8 here:
4.3 Post-Entry
So far we have conrmed that rms that are more productive, larger, more capital
intensive and paying higher wages self select into more advanced export markets.
However, this nding does not exclude post-entry performance di¤erentials among
rms exporting towards di¤erent types of regions. That is even if HI exporters al-
ready show ex-ante superior performance with respect to the MLI exporters, they
could improve their performance di¤erential after the export entry. Such di¤er-
ential may emerge since (i) developed countries are endowed with more advanced
technology and knowledge accumulation serving such economies is expected to gen-
erate more learning e¤ects compared to exporting to less advanced economies (ii)
rms face higher competition in more advanced markets forcing them to improve
their e¢ ciency.
In this part of the study we aim to accurately identify the heterogeneity in
productivity gains associated with rmsinvolvement in di¤erent type of export
markets. We mainly establish average treatment models using matching tech-
niques. Particularly, we apply the propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm
together with a di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID) methodology. While testing for
the post-entry mechanisms at work this methodology allows us to control for the
self selection process.
Our aim is to estimate the productivity gains associated with export entry
separately for HI and MLI countries. We establish four treatment models. In the
rst and second models, our treatment group consists of rms that do not export at
time t 1 (non-exporter), start exporting only to the HI countries (MLI countries)
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at time t and continue exporting only to the HI countries (MLI countries) at time
t + 1, whereas our control group includes rms that has never exported over the
analysis period. Accordingly,we have seven cohorts that each correspond to a year
between 2004 and 2010. Note that here we restrict our treated sample to rms that
start exporting to only HI or only MLI countries. Although these rms constitute a
small share of the sample, this restriction is necessary to accurately to identify the
di¤erentials in productivity gains. In the third and fourth models, our treatment
group consists of rms that were exporting only to the MLI countries (HI countries)
at time t   1 and start to export to HI countries (MLI countries) at time t and
continue to export both types of markets at time t+ 1. Our control group covers
the rms that remain exporting only to the MLI countries (HI countries) over the
analysis period. We calculate the average treatment e¤ects on the treated (ATT)
rms as follows:
ATT = E(Yit(1)  Yit(0)jDi = 1) = E(Yit(1)jDi = 1)  E(Yit(0)jDi = 1) (3)
For the rst two models, equation (XX) shows the di¤erence between the pro-
ductivity level after the rm, which is formerly non-exporter (Di = 1), starts
exporting only to the HI countries (MLI countries) (Yit(1)jDi = 1) and the poten-
tial productivity it would have if it would have never exported to HI countries (MLI
countries) (Yit(0)jDi = 1). Similarly, for the third and fourth models, equation
(XX) shows the di¤erence between the outcome of the HI starter (MLI starter) that
is formerly an exporter to only MLI countries (only HI countries) (Yit(1)jDi = 1)
and the potential outcome it would have if it had stayed as an only MLI exporter
(only HI exporter) (Yit(0)jDi = 1). The potential outcomes of both models are
unknown. Nevertheless, we can calculate the outcome for control groups, which
can be dened as E(Yit(0)jDi = 0). Therefore, there can be a selection bias when
ATT is calculated. The bias is dened as11
B(ATT ) = E(Yit(0)jDi = 1)  E(Yit(0)jDi = 0) (4)
To overcome the possible selection bias problem in our data set, we will apply
PSM techniques jointly with di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology (DID). Combi-
nation of matching techniques with DID is likely to improve the quality of non
experimental evaluation studies (Blundel and Costa Dias, 2000). In particular,
the DID removes e¤ects of common shocks and provides a clear estimate of the
treatment e¤ect on the productivity di¤erentials. We dene the
11Dehajia andWahba (2002) suggest that comparing a treatment group with a non-
experimental control group can give biased results because of problems such as self-selection
or some systematic judgment by the researcher in selecting treatment units.
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PSM-DID estimator as follows where the resulting ATT gives the di¤erence
between average treatment e¤ects of treated and non-treated groups in which
time-invariant unobservables are eliminated:
PSM DIDATT = E(Yit(1)  Yit(0)jDi = 1)  E(Yit(1)  Yit(0)jDi = 0) (5)
In order to nd the control units to be matched with the treated units we
estimate probit models from which we recover the propensity scores. The depen-
dent variable in the probit specications is the probability to start to export HI
countries (MLI countries) at time t and the vector of covariates consists of the
logarithms of TFP (or LP), WAGE_L, EMP, CAPINT as well as year, sector and
region dummies. All of the independent variables are in their one period lagged
value. We include the lagged values of the covariates since current values of these
variables can also be a¤ected by exporting (importing) behavior of the rms12. We
check whether the matching procedure is e¤ective or not by comparing the means
of the explanatory variables in both matched and unmatched samples.
Making use of the propensity scores resulting from the probit estimates, we ap-
ply the Kernel matching and in Table 9 we show some tests revealing the quality of
the matching. We check whether the means of covariates are signicantly di¤erent
in matched and unmatched samples. Our results show that the matching proce-
dure eliminates the inequality for means of covariates and signicant di¤erences
disappear in the matched sample. The advantage of kernel matching compared to
other matching algorithms is the exploitation of as much information as possible
from the control group. This gains special importance in our case as we have low
number of rms in all treatment groups described above.
Insert Table 9 here:
The resulting ATTs from the kernel matching explains whether exporting to
HI countries (MLI countries) improve the productivity of the rm. Particularly,
we compare these productivity improvements and test whether there are higher
productivity gains for rms exporting their products to relatively more advanced
economies. In Table 10, we present the ATTs that result from kernel matching
and comment on the heterogeneity in the e¤ects of exporting to di¤erent types
of countries on rm productivity. ATTs for the rst and second models show
the impact of starting to export only to the HI countries (MLI countries) on the
productivity of formerly non-exporting rms. Whereas, ATTs for the third and
fourth models show the impact of starting to export to HI countries (MLI coun-
tries) on the productivity of rms which are formerly exporting only to the MLI
12We include the higher powers of certain explanatory variables into the probit specications in
order to satisfy the balancing property of PSM algorithm following Dehajia and Wahba (2002).
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countries (HI countries). It is clearly shown that the positive productivity e¤ect
is robust over di¤erent type of destination markets in terms of both measures of
productivity. Note that rms that start exporting only to HI regions get addi-
tional productivity gains (compared to their counterparts which start exporting
only to MLI countries. That is although starting to export bring about produc-
tivity gains in both types of markets we observe higher productivity gains in HI
destination markets. For instance, starting to export only to HI countries increases
TFP by 53 percentage points immediately, whereas starting to export only to MLI
countries has a lower impact of 15 percentage points. In columns 2,3,5 and 6 of
Table 10 we assess whether starting to export raises productivity improvements
instantaneously or future productivity improvements occur as well. We nd that
additional productivity gains are realized in future years. Particularly, the benets
from starting to export to HI (MLI) countries signicantly improves over time i.e.
higher ATTs are obtained for the period t+1 with respect to the period t while in
period t+2 we have the largest ATTs in terms of both TFP and LP.
We observe positive and signicant productivity gains from starting to export
to HI (MLI) countries for the rms which are formerly exporting to only one type
of region in Table 10. This nding suggests that there exist positive diversication
e¤ects for rms which are already exporters. Still, di¤erentials in productivity
gains remain between rms that start to export HI destination markets and rms
that start to export MLI destination markets. The evidence clearly suggests higher
productivity improvements for starting to export developed regions of the world
(e.g. 36 versus 19 percentage points in TFP). Note that due to the low
number of observations ATTs for periods t+1 and t+2 cannot be calculated.
Insert Table 10 here:
Next, we employ PSM together with DID methodology in order to overcome
the biases that may result from time-invariant unobservables. Table 11 presents
the PSM-DID estimates. The outcome of the PSM-DID model represents the dif-
ference between the productivity levels of the rms before and after the treatment,
that is the di¤erence between the outcomes at time t-1 and t + 1.The PSM-DID
estimates support the ndings obtained by PSM. One can infer that when the
unobserved time-invariant e¤ects are eliminated, TFP signicantly rises by 4.1
(3.4) percentage points between t - 1 and t + 1, where the rms that are formerly
non-exporters and start to export only to HI (MLI) countries. A similar pattern of
improvement is evident for LP. On the other hand we observe signicant produc-
tivity gains for entry into additional type of export markets in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 11. Consistent with the results in Table 10 for a rm which is formerly ex-
porting to only one type of country starting to export to HI countries brings about
higher productivity gains with respect to starting to export to MLI countries (e.g.
16
22 versus 13 percentage points in TFP).
Insert Table 11 here:
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence for self selection into asymmetric markets and dif-
ferentials in post-entry e¤ects arose by involvement in these asymmetric markets
exploiting a comprehensive dataset of Turkish manufacturing rms over the period
2003-2011. The results of the study provide evidence that development stage of
destination markets matter in explaining the observed di¤erentials in exporters
performances. Our results indicate self-selection mechanisms and post-entry ef-
fects di¤er from market to market for Turkish manufacturing rms. Specically,
we conrm that rms that are more productive, larger, more capital intensive
and paying higher wages self select into more advanced export markets. Even if
HI exporters already show ex-ante superior performance with respect to the MLI
exporters, they could improve their performance di¤erential after the export entry.
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Turkish Manufacturing Firms’ Export Orientation Towards High and 
Medium-Low Income Countries
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Table 1. Variables Indicating Export Market Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dummy Variable Description 
 
Exporter
Only-HI 
takes value 1 if a firm is exporting only to HI countries 
Exporter
Only-MLI
 takes value 1 if a firm is exporting only to MLI 
countries 
Exporter
Both
 takes value 1 if a firm is exporting to both types of 
countries 
Exporter
HI-50
 takes value 1 if a firm is exporting over 50 percent of 
its export value to HI countries 
Exporter
MLI-50
 takes value 1 if a firm is exporting less than 50 percent 
of its export value to HI countries 
Exporter
HI-line
 takes value 1  if the number of export lines towards HI 
countries is greater than or equal to that of MLI 
countries 
Exporter
MLI-line
 takes value 1  if the number of export lines towards HI 
countries is less than that of MLI countries 
 
 
20 
 
Table 2. Number of Exporters w.r.to Export Orientation 
Year Exporter
Only_HI
 Exporter
Only_MLI
 Exporter
Both
 Exporter
HI_50
 Exporter
MLI_50
 Exporter
HI_line
 Exporter
MLI_line
 Exporters 
2003 2,124 1,041 3,466 4,143 2,488 3,902 2,729 6,631 
2004 2,349 1,262 4,057 4,596 3,072 4,351 3,317 7,668 
2005 2,568 1,783 4,804 5,127 4,028 4,828 4,327 9,155 
2006 2,415 1,955 5,109 5,091 4,388 4,734 4,745 9,479 
2007 2,155 1,893 5,023 4,781 4,290 4,359 4,712 9,071 
2008 1,952 1,925 5,083 4,460 4,500 4,072 4,888 8,960 
2009 1,770 1,820 4,691 3,988 4,293 3,624 4,657 8,281 
2010 1,988 2,596 5,675 4,618 5,641 4,110 6,149 10,259 
2011 1,953 2,710 5,663 4,435 5,891 3,922 6,404 10,326 
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Table 3. Distribution of Firms w.r.to Export Orientation 
    
    
  
Year Exporter
Only_HI
 Exporter
Only_MLI
 Exporter
Both
 Exporter
HI_50
 Exporter
MLI_50
 Exporter
HI_line
 Exporter
MLI_line
 
2003 32.03 15.70 52.27 62.48 37.52 58.84 41.16 
2004 30.63 16.46 52.91 59.94 40.06 56.74 43.26 
2005 28.05 19.48 52.47 56.00 44.00 52.74 47.26 
2006 25.48 20.62 53.90 53.71 46.29 49.94 50.06 
2007 23.76 20.87 55.37 52.71 47.29 48.05 51.95 
2008 21.79 21.48 56.73 49.78 50.22 45.45 54.55 
2009 21.37 21.98 56.65 48.16 51.84 43.76 56.24 
2010 19.38 25.30 55.32 45.01 54.99 40.06 59.94 
2011 18.91 26.24 54.84 42.95 57.05 37.98 62.02 
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Table 4. Firm Performance According to Export Orientation 
  TFP LP CAPINT EMP SALES WAGE_L 
Exporter
Only_HI
 7.830 10.078 120165.067 101.070 11859691.778 6836.050 
Exporter
Only_MLI
 7.480 9.961 115793.900 75.271 8757790.222 6483.936 
Exporter
Both
 7.918 10.316 159576.500 183.083 32444444.444 8804.195 
Exporter
HI_50
 7.876 10.284 154629.378 151.263 23566666.667 7927.461 
Exporter
MLI_50
 7.684 10.188 136623.767 130.430 21344444.444 7762.987 
Exporter
HI_line
 7.889 10.196 149526.589 157.861 24433333.333 7926.835 
Exporter
MLI_line
 7.654 10.174 138242.378 122.008 20633333.333 7782.734 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 5. Exporters’ Premia Across Destination Markets 
  TFP LP CAPINT 
Exporter
Only_HI
 0.0431*** 
 
  0.0500***     0.0288*** 
  
 
(0.00809) 
 
  (0.00787) 
 
  (0.00690) 
  
Exporter
Only_MLI
 0.0481*** 
 
  0.0510*** 
 
  0.0136* 
  
 
(0.00888) 
 
  (0.00861) 
 
  (0.00769) 
  
Exporter
Both
 0.0924*** 
 
  0.0989*** 
 
  0.0289*** 
  
 
(0.00873) 
 
  (0.00852) 
 
  (0.00814) 
  Exporter
HI_50
 
 
0.0584***     0.0652***   
 
0.0222*** 
 
  
(0.00791)     (0.00770)   
 
(0.00723) 
 
Exporter
MLI_50
 
 
0.0559***     0.0598***   
 
0.0212*** 
 
  
(0.00747)     (0.00725)   
 
(0.00668) 
 
Exporter
HI_line
 
  
0.0595*** 
  
0.0650*** 
  
0.0284*** 
   
(0.00776) 
  
(0.00755) 
  
(0.00707) 
Exporter
MLI_line
 
  
0.0548*** 
  
0.0598*** 
  
0.0250*** 
   
(0.00747) 
  
(0.00724) 
  
(0.00665) 
Observations 137062 137062 137062 143507 143507 143507 146840 146840 146840 
R-squared 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.276 0.276 0.276 
  
  EMP SALES WAGE_L 
Exporter
Only_HI
 0.0525*** 
 
  0.104*** 
 
  0.0127*** 
  
 
(0.00495) 
 
  (0.00712) 
 
  (0.00293) 
  
Exporter
Only_MLI
 0.0385*** 
 
  0.0952*** 
 
  0.00717** 
  
 
(0.00476) 
 
  (0.00736) 
 
  (0.00317) 
  
Exporter
Both
 0.108*** 
 
  0.201*** 
 
  0.0281*** 
  
 
(0.00551) 
 
  (0.00790) 
 
  (0.00321) 
  
Exporter
HI_50
 
 
0.0618***   
 
0.132***   
 
0.0163*** 
 
  
(0.00450)   
 
(0.00678)   
 
(0.00278) 
 
Exporter
MLI_50
 
 
0.0606***   
 
0.117***   
 
0.0126*** 
 
  
(0.00466)   
 
(0.00674)   
 
(0.00293) 
 ExporterHI_line 
  
0.0625*** 
  
0.132*** 
  
0.0171*** 
   
(0.00444) 
  
(0.00667) 
  
(0.00282) 
Exporter
MLI_line
 
  
0.0599*** 
  
0.117*** 
  
0.0119*** 
   
(0.00467) 
  
(0.00670) 
  
(0.00291) 
Observations 157844 157844 157844 157508 157508 157508 157844 157844 157844 
R-squared 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.146 0.143 0.143 0.118 0.118 0.118 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6A. Self Selection into Exporting to Asymmetric Markets-Starters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  TFP LP CAPINT 
  t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Starter
Only_HI
 0.144*** 0.128*** 0.124*** 0.242*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.420*** 0.442*** 0.444*** 
 
(0.0248) (0.0206) (0.0173) (0.0240) (0.0200) (0.0166) (0.0416) (0.0360) (0.0308) 
Starter
Only_MLI
 0.0719*** 0.0717*** 0.0662*** 0.0878*** 0.0867*** 0.0862*** 0.312*** 0.354*** 0.389*** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0201) (0.0167) (0.0226) (0.0196) (0.0162) (0.0403) (0.0353) (0.0301) 
Starter
Both
 0.0750** 0.0748*** 0.0695*** 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.170*** 0.535*** 0.548*** 0.623*** 
 
(0.0347) (0.0299) (0.0261) (0.0334) (0.0290) (0.0252) (0.0621) (0.0512) (0.0439) 
Observations 17210 23375 33327 17636 24150 35067 19010 25946 37248 
R-squared 0.747 0.752 0.754 0.139 0.136 0.135 0.115 0.120 0.118 
  
  EMP SALES WAGE_L 
  t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Starter
Only_HI
 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.500*** 0.486*** 0.469*** 0.0586*** 0.0421*** 0.0427*** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0171) (0.0142) (0.0285) (0.0242) (0.0208) (0.0111) (0.00917) (0.00756) 
Starter
Only_MLI
 0.0760*** 0.0730*** 0.0495*** 0.354*** 0.347*** 0.341*** 0.0225** 0.0289*** 0.0278*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.0267) (0.0228) (0.0196) (0.0101) (0.00819) (0.00703) 
Starter
Both
 0.253*** 0.237*** 0.228*** 0.593*** 0.585*** 0.543*** 0.00185 0.0248* 0.0178 
 
(0.0332) (0.0278) (0.0226) (0.0456) (0.0382) (0.0327) (0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0111) 
Observations 20160 27881 41108 20136 27845 41012 20160 27881 41108 
R-squared 0.123 0.119 0.110 0.272 0.271 0.258 0.145 0.145 0.149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 6B. Self Selection into Exporting to Asymmetric Markets-Sustainers 
  TFP LP CAPINT 
  t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Sustainer
Only_HI
 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.231*** 0.227*** 0.202*** 0.405*** 0.463*** 0.495*** 
 
(0.0323) (0.0394) (0.0276) (0.0331) (0.0272) (0.0398) (0.0656) (0.0559) (0.0478) 
Sustainer
Only_MLI
 0.0333** 0.0317*** 0.0291* 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.324*** 0.384*** 0.447*** 
 
(0.0160) (0.0117) (0.0165) (0.0359) (0.0258) (0.0313) (0.0674) (0.0568) (0.0483) 
Sustainer
Both
 0.107* 0.106** 0.0548 0.222*** 0.219*** 0.199*** 0.575*** 0.600*** 0.643*** 
 
(0.0539) (0.0441) (0.0415) (0.0496) (0.0413) (0.0392) (0.0975) (0.0749) (0.0642) 
Observations 14804 20218 28921 15207 20953 30561 16506 22654 32589 
R-squared 0.744 0.751 0.752 0.115 0.118 0.117 0.107 0.112 0.112 
  
  EMP SALES WAGE_L 
  t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Sustainer
Only_HI
 0.240*** 0.202*** 0.195*** 0.475*** 0.464*** 0.454*** 0.0472*** 0.0474*** 0.0406*** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0248) (0.0420) (0.0512) (0.0364) (0.0181) (0.0149) (0.0129) 
Sustainer
Only_MLI
 0.0545* 0.0636*** 0.0521*** 0.320*** 0.354*** 0.395*** 0.0115 0.00770 0.0122 
 
(0.0286) (0.0229) (0.0195) (0.0443) (0.0356) (0.0313) (0.0169) (0.0136) (0.0117) 
Sustainer
Both
 0.295*** 0.289*** 0.277*** 0.662*** 0.653*** 0.609*** 0.000785 0.0309 0.0195 
 
(0.0529) (0.0424) (0.0343) (0.0705) (0.0580) (0.0494) (0.0222) (0.0195) (0.0168) 
Observations 17630 24545 36333 17609 24514 36254 17630 24545 36333 
R-squared 0.101 0.100 0.093 0.237 0.238 0.228 0.133 0.136 0.141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Dynamic Panel Probit Regressions  
               
  ExporterHI ExporterHI_50 ExporterHI_line ExporterMLI ExporterMLI_50 ExporterMLI_line 
ExporterHI(t-1) 1.250*** 
  
0.759*** 
  
 
(0.0179) 
  
(0.0143) 
  ExporterHI_50(t-1) 
 
1.229*** 
  
1.177*** 
 
  
(0.0181) 
  
(0.0175) 
 ExporterHI_line(t-1) 
  
1.196*** 
  
1.108*** 
   
(0.0175) 
  
(0.0178) 
TFP(t-1) 0.0898*** 0.0397*** 0.0349*** 0.0754*** 0.0419*** 0.0481*** 
 
(0.00789) (0.00920) (0.00927) (0.00929) (0.00932) (0.00927) 
EMP(t-1) 0.0993*** 0.0881*** 0.0687*** 0.202*** 0.0731*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.00885) (0.00994) (0.00992) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
CAPINT(t-1) 0.0150*** 0.0423*** 0.0437*** 0.0830*** 0.0548*** 0.0552*** 
 
(0.00474) (0.00561) (0.00565) (0.00579) (0.00577) (0.00576) 
WAGE_L(t-1) 0.0886*** 0.0356* 0.0509** 0.0563*** 0.00604 0.017 
 
(0.0173) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
Initial Exporter dummy 0.681*** 1.121*** 1.149*** 1.274*** 1.160*** 1.243*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0265) (0.0261) (0.0294) (0.0289) (0.0286) 
Observations 105035 105035 105035 105035 105035 105035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Probit Estimations for the Probability of 
Upgrading 
  t-1 t-2 
TFP 0.0477*** 0.0464*** 
  (0.00787) (0.00866) 
EMP 0.0741*** 0.0671*** 
  (0.00637) (0.00705) 
CAPINT 0.0256*** 0.0270*** 
  (0.00432) (0.00476) 
WAGE_L 0.0311** 0.0214* 
  (0.0133) 0.0125 
    
 Observations 52815 42756 
 
Table 9.  Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups: Matched vs. 
Unmatched 
Panel A 
Treatment Group: Firms that start exporting only to the HI countries 
Control Group: Never-exporters 
                            
                           Matched Sample                     Unmatched Sample 
(Lagged values) Starter Never-
exporter 
T-Test for 
the Mean 
Differences 
Starter Never-
exporter 
T-Test for the 
Mean 
Differences 
TFP 8.1346 8.0401 0.9 8.1299 7.1763 11.51 
LP 10.154 10.06 1.69 10.144 9.7217 11.7 
WAGE_L 8.6837 8.6622 0.65 8.6904 8.5472 6.92 
EMP 4.1204 4.1156 0.09 4.1198 3.7389 12.93 
CAPINT 10.663 10.557 1.14 10.597 10.239 6.03 
Sample Size 691 15,472   1,044 58,740   
       Panel B 
Treatment Group: Firms that start exporting only to the MLI countries 
Control Group: Never-exporters 
                            
                           Matched Sample                     Unmatched Sample 
(Lagged values) Starter Never-
exporter 
T-Test for 
the Mean 
Differences 
Starter Never-
exporter 
T-Test for the 
Mean 
Differences 
TFP 7.4697 7.3492 1.17 7.4495 7.1763 2.73 
LP 9.9757 9.9394 0.7 9.9593 9.7217 6.63 
WAGE_L 8.6077 8.5972 0.41 8.6021 8.5472 2.87 
EMP 3.8496 3.8137 0.82 3.8434 3.7389 2.53 
CAPINT 10.633 10.592 0.4 10.621 10.206 4.96 
Sample Size 734 15,308   1,104 58,740   
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       Panel C 
Treatment Group: MLI exporters start to export to HI countries 
Control Group: Always MLI exporters 
                            
                           Matched Sample                     Unmatched Sample 
(Lagged values) Starter Always 
MLI-
exporter 
T-Test for 
the Mean 
Differences 
Starter Always 
MLI-
exporter 
T-Test for the 
Mean 
Differences 
TFP 7.7317 7.5546 1.01 7.7241 7.4367 2.92 
LP 10.222 10.221 0.02 10.295 9.9566 3.17 
WAGE_L 8.7129 8.6237 0.47 8.7006 8.5852 2.55 
EMP 4.0893 4.0511 0.9 4.1062 3.6067 5.24 
CAPINT 10.814 10.681 1.4 10.799 10.413 3.2 
Sample Size 852 110   1,255 1,632   
       Panel D 
Treatment Group: HI exporters start to export to MLI countries 
Control Group: Always HI exporters 
                            
              Matched Sample                     Unmatched Sample 
(Lagged values) Starter Always HI-
exporter 
T-Test for 
the Mean 
Differences 
Starter Always HI-
exporter 
T-Test for the 
Mean 
Differences 
TFP 7.9142 7.8749 0.96 7.8925 7.6704 3.09 
LP             
WAGE_L 8.7645 8.7383 1.25 8.7645 8.5655 5.29 
EMP 4.2876 4.1783 0.91 4.2876 3.8905 5.42 
CAPINT 10.828 10.841 -1.26 10.836 10.446 6.42 
Sample Size 1,127 201   1,602 1,565   
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Table 10. PSM Estimates 
  TFPt TFPt+1     TFPt+2 LPt LPt+1 LPt+2 
ATT (Non-Exporter Firms Start to Export 
Only to HI)  
0.533*** 0.550*** 0.606*** 0.305*** 0.324*** 0.329*** 
0.046 0.045 0.061 0.03 0.031 0.034 
ATT (Non-Exporter Firms Start to Export 
Only to MLI)  
0.158*** 0.195*** 0.204*** 0.243*** 0.257*** 0.264*** 
0.047 0.05 0.062 0.028 0.027 0.033 
ATT (Only MLI Exporter Start to Export to 
HI)  
0.365***   0.302***   
0.119   0.061   
ATT (Only HI Exporter Start to Export to 
MLI) 
0.192**     0.136**     
  0.094     0.063     
 
 
Table 11. PSM-DID Estimates 
Average Treatment Effects From PSM-DID Estimates 
  ATT ATT ATT ATT 
Non-
Exporter 
Firms Start 
to Export 
Only to HI  
Non-Exporter 
Firms Start to 
Export Only to 
MLI  
Only MLI 
Exporter Start 
to Export to 
HI  
Only HI 
Exporter Start 
to Export to 
MLI 
Outcome:         
TFPt+1-TFPt-1 0.041* 0.034* 0.229* 0.133* 
0.023 0.018 0.134 0.076 
  0.043* 0.038* 0.269* 0.183* 
LPt+1-LPt-1 
0.0023 0.021 0.158 0.095 
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